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LETTING THE MARKET CONTROL ADVERTISING BY




Much has been written about lawyer advertising since the
landmark decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, which recog-
nized that paid commercial advertising by lawyers to solicit clients
enjoyed some first amendment protection and could not therefore
be totally banned.1 Unfortunately, post-Bates writing focused on
regulation, as evidenced by ABA Proposal A, which limited lawyer
advertising within specified guidelines in response to Bates.2 In
1982 the United States Supreme Court decided In re R.M.J.,
which rejected this regulatory approach, and held that while false
or misleading advertising can be prohibited, potentially false or
misleading advertising can only be controlled through the least re-
strictive means, and truthful advertising can be regulated only if
the state has a substantial interest.'
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia, A.B., Franklin & Mar-
shall College, 1970; J.D., Seton Hall University, 1975.
1. 433 U.S. 350, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977). The two lawyers involved, Bates and
O'Steen, were former legal services attorneys who left legal services to start their own legal
clinic to provide routine legal services to individuals of moderate incomes. Id. at 353-54.
Their advertisement was placed in one newspaper of general circulation in the Phoenix,
Arizona area, and read, "Do You Need A Lawyer? Legal Services at Very Reasonable Fees."
Id. at 385 app. The advertisement indicated the specific fees that Bates and O'Steen would
charge for uncontested divorces or separations, uncontested adoptions, uncontested personal
bankruptcy, and change of name, and noted that information about other available services
would be furnished upon request. Id.
2. For a discussion of Proposal A (currently MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONA RESPONSI-
BILITY DR 2-101 (1980)), see infra note 70.
3. 451 U.S. 191 (1982). Missouri, following Bates, had adopted a regulatory approach to
lawyer advertising along the lines of Proposal A, but somewhat less restrictive. See id. at
193-96 & 192-93 nn.2-4. Respondent violated the Missouri rules by sending announcements
of the opening of his office to selected persons, by including information in newspaper and
yellow page advertising not permitted by the rules, and by falling to include a disclaimer, as
required by the rules. See id. at 196-98. The unpermitted information which respondent
advertised included the fact that he was licensed to practice in Illinois, Missouri, and before
the United States Supreme Court. Additionally, his listing of fields of practice deviated
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While there have been some disciplinary actions against law-
yers for advertising, such actions have displayed more an absence
of regulation than effective discipline. Between the Bates decision
in 1977 and the middle of 1982, there were thirteen published deci-
sions involving the discipline of lawyers for advertising and solici-
tation violations.4 The alleged violations included one advertise-
ment on radio,5 one advertisement as part of a mailer,6 six letter
from those permitted (personal injury instead of tort law, real estate instead of property
law) and included areas of practice which were not specifically permitted by the Missouri
rules (contract, zoning and land use, communication, pension and profit sharing plans). Id.
at 197. There was no suggestion that any of the information used by the respondent was in
any way false or misleading. See id. at 197-98.
4. These do not include non-discipline actions which challenged the advertising regula-
tions of a particular state. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719
(1980). (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) suit against Virginia Supreme Court and Bar Association
for failure to change advertising following Bates); Foley v. Alabama State Bar, 648 F.2d 355
(5th Cir. 1981) (antitrust and civil rights action to enjoin prosecution of ethics violation and
to declare advertising rules unconstitutional); Princeton Community Phone Book, Inc. v.
Bate, 582 F.2d 706 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978) (declaratory judgment
challenging state bar advisory opinion restricting telephone book advertising); Lovett & Lin-
der, Ltd. v. Carter, 523 F. Supp. 903 (D.R.L 1981) (declaratory judgment and injunctive
action against order of Rhode Island Supreme Court involving same attorneys); Bishop v.
Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct, 521 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (§ 1983
action challenging advertising rules); Durham v. Brock, 498 F. Supp. 213 (M.D. Tenn. 1980)
(declaratory judgment and injunctive action to challenge post-Bates amendments to adver-
tising rules); Allison v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d 489 (La. 1978) (action to enjoin
solicitation rules regarding group legal service plans); Reed v. Allison & Perrone, 376 So. 2d
1067 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (trade practice suit by two attorneys against two other attorneys)
(for further discussion of Reed, see infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text); In re
Oldtowne Legal Clinic, 285 Md. 132, 400 A.2d 1111 (1979) (petition to use a trade name);
McLellan v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 413 So. 2d 705 (Miss. 1981) (declaring yellow page
restrictions unconstitutional); In re Mountain Bell Directory Advertising, 604 P.2d 760
(Mont. 1979) (telephone company petition to include field of practice advertising in yellow
pages); In re Opinion 475, 89 N.J. 74, 444 A.2d 1092 (1982) (petition challenging rule requir-
ing all names on firm letterhead to be New Jersey admitted attorneys); In re Utah State Bar
Ass'n Petition for Approval of Changes in Disciplinary Rules on Advertising, 647 P.2d 991
(Utah 1982) (changes in the advertising rules).
5. See In re Carroll, 124 Ariz. 80, 84-85, 602 P.2d 461, 465-66 (1979). Following the
explosion of a tank car in 1973 in which many persons were injured, an investigator who had
occasionally worked for respondent took out a radio advertisement offering free air trans-
port to hospitals for injured persons and families and implying that the investigator was
offering these benefits on behalf of "a Phoenix law firm" which was taken to be respondent.
See id. at 82 & n.1, 602 P.2d at 462-63. The court doubted that the radio advertisement
would be considered to comply with Bates, but because of the confusion over what was
permitted, refused to discipline respondent for the advertisement. Id. at 85, 602 P.2d at 466.
6. See Eaton v. Supreme Court of Ark., 270 Ark. 573, 607 S.W.2d 55 (1980), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981). Petitioner appealed a private reprimand for contracting with an
advertising firm to place an advertisement for lawyers in a mailer designed to go to 10,000
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solicitation matters,7 three telephone directory related advertise-
ments,8 a claim of false advertising in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4)
targeted homes in the Little Rock area. See id. at 576, 607 S.W.2d at 56. Though agreeing
that the advertisement resembled the one in Bates, the court found it deceptive in repre-
senting that the lawyers could be consulted without regard to subject area. Id. at 580, 607
S.W.2d at 59. The court found this representation too broad and therefore unhelpful in
aiding a consumer. Id. Objecting also to the insertion of the advertisement in a mailer which
consisted almost entirely of discount coupons, the court affirmed the reprimand. Id. at 580,
583, 607 S.W.2d at 59, 61.
7. See The Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 407 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1981), vacated and remanded,
51 U.S.L.W. 2282 (Fla. Nov. 9, 1982) (dismissal of case involving letter solicitation to inter-
national trade concern soliciting immigration and naturalization cases vacated and re-
manded because solicitation involved monetary benefit to attorney rather than promotion of
individual rights); Kansas v. Moses, 231 Kan. 243, 642 P.2d 1004 (1982) (letter to 150 people
in the process of selling real estate warrants public censure as client solicitation); Kentucky
Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978) (letter to real estate firms soliciting real
estate business and setting forth fees is permissible and does not constitute direct solicita-
tion); In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981) (letters and brochures soliciting contin-
gent fee clients for complex litigation involving birth control devices is constitutionally pro-
tected); In re Greene, 54 N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d 390, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 1738 (1982) (letter to real estate brokers soliciting real estate business is pro-
tected); Koffier v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981) (letter to approximately 7,500 property owners soliciting
real estate business is constitutionally protected).
8. See In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1981), rev'd, 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Zimmerman
v. Office of Grievance Comm., 79 A.D.2d 263, 438 N.Y.S.2d 400 (4th Dep't 1981); Carter v.
Lovett & Linder, Ltd., 425 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1981).
The Missouri court opinion in R.M.J. gave no indication that the offending advertising
was in the telephone book. See 609 S.W.2d at 411-12. The Supreme Court made clear, how-
ever, that a substantial portion of the case centered around telephone book advertising with
the remainder concerning letters to non-clients as well as newspaper advertising. See 455
U.S. at 205-06. The private reprimand of respondent was reversed. Id. at 207.
For a more detailed discussion of Zimmerman, see infra notes 19-26 and accompanying
text. The attorney in Zimmerman received a public reprimand. See 79 A.D.2d at 266, 438
N.Y.S.2d at 403.
Carter is perhaps the most fascinating of the telephone book cases. Following Bates, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court issued an order permitting advertising in the yellow pages.
See 425 A.2d at 1245. Relying on the manager of the local telephone company, who indi-
cated that the telephone company considered the inside of each cover of the telephone di-
rectory as part of the yellow pages, even though white in color, the attorneys placed their
advertising on the inside back cover. Id. The court refused to permit continued advertising
in this manner, indicating that Bates did not permit a competitive struggle among attorneys
to place advertising on the inside back cover: "Hereafter, any advertisement placed in the
telephone directory by an attorney shall be in those pages that are colored yellow and within
that section of the yellow pages which carries the designation 'Lawyers.'" Id. The attorneys
also used field of practice advertising which was not permitted because potential clients
could be misled. Id. at 1245-46. Though finding a violation, the court imposed no discipline.
Id. In Lovett & Linder, Ltd. v. Carter, 523 F. Supp. 903 (D.R.I. 1981), the federal district
court sustained the Supreme Court of Rhode Island's finding of field of practice advertising,
but invalidated the provision of the state court's order limiting advertising only to the "yel-
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of the Code of Professional Responsibility," and one advertisement
offering a discount.10 The matters were brought to the courts of
Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, New York and Rhode Island and thus represent a fair cross-
section of views within the United States.
As a result of these disciplinary matters, one lawyer was sus-
pended, but not for the advertising violation,1 one lawyer received
a private reprimand, 2 three lawyers received public reprimands, 13
one case has been remanded, 14 one case found a violation but im-
posed no discipline,1 5 and five cases were dismissed.1 6 In addition
to these reported cases, the National Center for Professional Re-
sponsibility has published statistics for lawyer discipline, including
the number of advertising complaints filed against lawyers which
resulted either in no discipline or private discipline." In 1980, of
low pages."
9. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Gangwish, 618 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1981). In Gangwish, an
attorney placed an advertisement in a newspaper under the name of a corporation he alleg-
edly created offering to find real parents for adopted children. See id. at 176. When persons
responded, he wrote to them on his own letterhead indicating he was attorney for the corpo-
ration empowered to enter into contracts. Id. Though he "created" the corporation, its doc-
uments were never filed and thus did not have any legal existence. Id. The court found the
conduct in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) and publicly reprimanded him. Id. at 176-77.
10. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Gangwish, 630 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1982). The attorney, the same
one as in Gangwish, 618 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1981), advertised in a church bulletin and a bro-
chure of the Chamber of Commerce offering discounts, e.g., "twenty-percent (20%) discount
to members of the Chamber on the cost of legal services." See 630 S.W.2d at 66. The court
found this advertising beyond the scope of advertising of fees for "routine services" and
publicly reprimanded the attorney. Id. at 67.
11. See In re Carroll, 124 Ariz. at 86, 602 P.2d at 467. The attorney was disciplined for
violations relating to contingent fee contracts and advancement of monies to clients.
12. See Eaton, 607 S.W.2d at 56, 61.
13. See Moses, 231 Kan. at -, 642 P.2d at 1007; Gangwish, 630 S.W.2d at 67;
Gangwish, 618 S.W.2d at 177; Zimmerman, 79 A.D. at 266, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
14. See Schreiber, 407 So. 2d at 599-600. The original reversal was vacated because of
the decision in R.M.J. See Schreiber, 51 U.S.L.W. 2282, vacating and remanding 407 So. 2d
595 (Fla. 1981).
15. See Carter v. Lovett & Linder, Ltd., 425 A.2d at 1246.
16. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978); In re Appert, 315
N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981); In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1981), rev'd, 451 U.S. 191
(1982); In re Greene, 54 N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d 390, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 1738 (1982); Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432
N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981).
17. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR PRoFEssIoNAL RESPONSimILTy, ABA, Statistical Report
Re: Expense, Case Volume, and Staffing of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement in State Ju-
risdictions During 1980, in DISCipLINARY LAW AND PROCEDURE RESEARCH SYsTEm chart VIII
(1980).
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the twenty-four jurisdictions which reported, there were 226 adver-
tising complaints filed against lawyers which did not result in dis-
cipline and 110 complaints which resulted in private discipline. '8 It
is evident that, although lawyer advertising has been the subject of
much discussion, very little has actually been done by the bar to
assure legal consumers that when lawyer advertising is presented
to them, it will indeed aid in the process of informed selection of a
lawyer.
A recent New York disciplinary decision reflects the difficulty
in using the regulatory system as a mechanism for enforcing adver-
tising standards. In Zimmerman v. Office of Grievance Committee,
the attorney-respondent was a 1977 law school graduate who pub-
lished his name in the 1980-1981 telephone directory under
twenty-five separate practice areas. 9 These subject areas covered
legal fields including "Administrative and Government Law," "Ad-
miralty Law," "Consumer Law," "Criminal Law," "Debt Collec-
tions," "Insurance Law," "Labor Law," "Taxation," and "Work-
men's Compensation," among others.20 At the top of the page
listing the areas of practice in the telephone directory, there was a
general disclaimer indicating that a lawyer's listing under a partic-
ular practice area did not "necessarily" mean that the lawyer had
"been certified by any state or federal authority as having any
18. Id.
19. 79 A.D.2d 263, 263-64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 400, 401 (4th Dep't 1981).
20. See id. at 263, 264, 267 app. A, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 401, 404 app. A. The listing was
titled "LAWYERS Grouped by Practice" and listed the following areas:
Accidents-Personal Injury/Property Damage Immigration & Naturalization
Administrative & Governmental Law Insurance Law
Admiralty Law Juvenile Law
Anti-Trust & Trade Regulations Labor Law
Appellate Practice Landlord & Tenant
Bankruptcy Marital & Family Law
Consumer Law Real Property Law
Corporation, Partnership & Business Law Securities Law
Criminal Law Taxation
Debt Collection Trial Practice
Environmental Law Wills, Trusts & Probate Estates
Estate Planning & Administration Workmen's Compensation
General Practice
Id. at 267 app. A, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 404 app. A. Zimmerman was the only lawyer or firm
whose name was listed under each area. See id. In fact, Zimmerman was the only lawyer
listed under the practice areas of Admiralty, Anti-Trust & Trade Regulations, Consumer
Law, Insurance Law, Juvenile Law, Labor Law, Securities Law and Taxation. Id.
1982]
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more competence in these areas than any other lawyers." 21 Despite
this statement, the New York court found that if the purpose of
such a listing was to facilitate consumer selection of an appropriate
attorney, "this expectation may not be attained by retaining re-
spondent, who candidly admits to" his lack of experience in many of
the identified areas of law in which his name is listed. '22
As a result of this lack of experience, the court held that the
advertising by the respondent was both deceptive and misleading
within the meaning of DR 2-101(A).23 The effect of the Zimmer-
man listing was such that potential legal consumers could be
"beguiled. '24
However, because of his inexperience, his reliance on the dis-
claimer, and an apparent lack of intent to deceive, Zimmerman
was only censured by the court.25 While the inexperience of a law-
yer is a perfectly permissible factor to mitigate a disciplinary viola-
tion, its use in this case presented a curiously incongruous result.
The very same evidence used to show that the advertising was de-
ceptive-inexperience and undue reliance on the disclaimer-was
also used to enable Zimmerman to avoid more severe discipline.
It is not difficult to imagine the public's perception of the bar
as a result of a case like Zimmerman. While the legal profession
has indeed provided some regulation for the "beguiled" client who
sought the lawyer out because of the advertisement, the client
must feel unsatisfied.
You can't get any redress for your grievances either, from anybody, because I
tried. I still tried, I went through the grievance process and they said, "Yeah,
yeah, he ripped you off," and I'm still in the same spot as when I started. The
21. Id.
22. Id. at 265, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 402. Zimmerman claimed that, in any area in which he
did not have appropriate experience, he was associated with a law firm that could aid him.
Id. at 264, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 401-02. Rejecting such a defense, the court noted that such a
claim only added to the potential deception. Id. at 265, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
23. See id. at 266, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 402-03.
24. The court found that the purpose of advertising is to permit truthful information to
be passed along to potential consumers. Id. at 265, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
No detailed guideline or signpost other than an innate sense of right or wrong
should be necessary to achieve this goal. A lawyer, particularly, should have an
awareness of the moral quality of his own conduct and the ability to make the
obvious judgment that the design of [this] advertisement is to gain clients by
guile and delusion.




Grievance Board didn't care about my rights, they cared about their lawyer
tliey had in front of them.
2 6
This Article is not intended to be critical of lawyer discipline;
indeed it is believed that the legal profession stands above all
others in weeding out the incompetent.27 The problem is not in
discipline; rather it is in the very essence of advertising regulation,
a subject called by Henry Drinker more a matter of etiquette than
of legal ethics. 28 It is crucial to professional regulation that the bar
control the kind of false, fraudulent or misleading advertising
which can be prohibited as a result of cases such as In re R.M.J.,29
given the rather fluid notions of lawyer-advertisers' first amend-
ment rights as well as the after-the-fact nature of advertising regu-
lation.30 Yet it seems clear, as the post-Bates cases show, that the
relatively mild discipline imposed as a result of false advertising
will not deter other lawyers from engaging in similar conduct. As a
result, the proper purpose of advertising, to provide legal consum-
ers with meaningful selection alternatives, will not be met and dis-
satisfaction with the profession will remain high.
As advertising by lawyers continues to increase, following
R.M.J. and the possible enactment of rules such as the Kutak
Model Rule 7.1,1 perhaps the best deterrent to false advertising by
26. See Transcript of John Smith (from videotape Professional Misconduct: Conversa-
tions with Victims, L. Dubin producer) reprinted in TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSEBIL-
rry 187, 212 (P. Keenan ed. 1979).
27. See Devine, Lawyer Discipline in Missouri: Is a New Ethics Code Necessary, 46
Mo. L. REV. 709, 737-40, 763 (1981).
28. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 211 n.3 (1953). This same statement was noted by
the Supreme Court in Bates. See 433 U.S. at 371.
29. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
30. See A.B.A. Approves Lawyer Advertising Rules, 63 A.B.A.J. 1177, 1234 (1977) (dis-
cussing both Proposal A and Proposal B of the ABA).
31. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (Final Draft 1981). The rule
provides:
Rule 7.1 Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services
A lawyer shall not make any false or misleading communication about the
lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it:
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact neces-
sary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can
achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that
violate the rules of professional conduct or other law; or
(c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the
comparison can be factually substantiated.
Id. The original comment to the rule rejects the "laundry list" approach on the theory that
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lawyers is a combination of enforcement plus free market control.
While disciplinary agencies must continue to press for compliance
with the profession's rules, the consumers of legal services must
also be encouraged to file civil suits against lawyers when there are
legitimate civil wrongs. Such suits would recognize that "the com-
mon law may be more attentive to client needs than is the griev-
ance process."32
This Article suggests one alternative: the civil suit against a
lawyer who has engaged in false advertising on the theory that
such advertising violates existing state-enacted deceptive trade
practice statutes. In order to evaluate this suggested client remedy,
Part I of this Article will consider the basis of liability under such
statutes, and Part II will apply that basis to the procedure used
under the acts to determine the effectiveness of deceptive trade
practice liability as a deterrent to false advertising.
I. LIABILITY UNDER DEcEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACTS
A. The Legal Basis
It would be the rare advocate who would think of applying the
provisions of deceptive trade practice or consumer fraud statutes
to the services of a lawyer. Generally, such acts are thought of as
applying more to the door-to-door salesperson and the automobile
dealer than to the professional. A recent Texas case should serve to
make lawyers rethink that position.
In April 1977, Marilyn and Donny Staggs hired Douglas
DeBakey, Esq., for the purpose of changing the name of Marilyn
Staggs' daughter by a previous marriage.3 3 Though he filed the
complaint, numerous deficiencies in the proceedings caused the
Staggs to tire of DeBakey's representation and change attorneys.
Following successful completion of the name change proceeding
with other counsel, Mr. and Mrs. Staggs filed suit against attorney
the bar cannot "identify information that the public might think relevant." See MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 comment Proposed Final Draft (1981).
The Supreme Court referred to the Model Rule, but did not specifically approve it in
R.M.J. See 451 U.S. at 201 n.14.
32. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEO.
L.J. 705, 733 (1981).
33. See DeBakey v. Staggs, 605 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), afl'd per
curiam, 612 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1981). At the time DeBakey was hired, he was paid $120.00
toward an estimated fee of $250.00. See 605 S.W.2d at 632.
358 [Vol. 31
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DeBakey alleging that DeBakey's failures unnecessarily caused
them to hire another attorney and suffer needless mental
anguish. The suit was filed, not as a malpractice action, but as a
consumer fraud action, under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act.3 5 Ruling that the Act covered legal services, the Texas trial
court agreed that an action could be maintained against DeBakey
for consumer fraud. 6 As a result, damages were awarded to the
Staggs in the amount of $420.s  In accordance with the provisions
of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, those damages were trebled
and attorney fees of $1,000 were also awarded against attorney
DeBakey.s5
While there appear to be no reported decisions imposing trade
practice liability upon attorneys for deceptive advertising, at least
one court has discussed the applicability of such statutes to lawyer
advertising. In Reed v. Allison & Perrone,39 two lawyers were sued
by other lawyers seeking an injunction against the defendants' al-
leged false advertising.40 The action was brought under the Louisi-
ana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law,4 1 which
grants to private individuals who suffer irreparable injury, that is,
injury not adequately compensable by monetary damages, the
right to seek an injunction against deceptive advertising as regu-
lated by the Act.42 Even though the defendants admitted that their
34. Id. Damages alleged and awarded to plaintiff by the trial court were the $120.00
initially paid to DeBakey, together with $300.00 to the new attorney. Id. The appellate court
reduced this award by $250.00, the amount the plaintiff originally agreed to pay DeBakey.
Id. at 633.
35. See Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1981-82).
36. See 605 S.W.2d at 633.
37. See supra note 34.
38. See 605 S.W.2d at 632-33.
39. 376 So. 2d 1067 (La. Ct. App. 1979). The firm of Allison & Perrone had previously
been involved in a solicitation controversy. In 1977, they had formed a plan designed to
provide pre-paid legal services for employee groups and had sought to enjoin enforcement of
any disciplinary rules against them. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied their petition.
See Allison v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d 489 (La. 1978).
40. See 376 So. 2d at 1068. The advertising was in the form of an advertisement con-
cerning the Legal Clinic of Allison & Perrone. See id. For a reprint of the complete adver-
tisement, see id. at 1070 app. Part of the advertisement indicated that defendants had "pio-
neered" the legal clinic concept in Louisiana. Id. Plaintiffs sought to compel, as part of their
requested relief, a new advertisement indicating that plaintiffs had operated a legal clinic
for many years. Id. at 1068.
41. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1401-:1418 (West Supp. 1982).
42. See 376 So. 2d at 1069. The Act itself has been interpreted as not granting a private
plaintiff an injunctive remedy. See Michaelson v. Motwani, 372 So. 2d 726 (La. Ct. App.
1982] 359
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advertised claim of resolving sixty percent of client problems at
the initial conference was misleading,43 the trial court denied relief
to the plaintiffs on the theory that regulation of lawyer advertising
was to be accomplished exclusively through the disciplinary ma-
chinery of the bar."
On appeal by the plaintiffs, the Louisiana Court of Appeals
disagreed, holding that "[a]dvertising of legal services is clearly a
'trade' or 'commerce' as defined by [statute]. It is, therefore, sub-
ject to the provisions of the [Act]. ' 5 Plaintiffs were denied relief,
however, for failure to meet the burden of proof of irreparable in-
jury 'necessary for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs' claims that defen-
dants' advertising caused irreparable injury to plaintiffs' livelihood
and professional reputation were deemed simply unsubstantiated. 46
What should be clear from the decisions in both DeBakey and
Reed is that an "attorney sells legal services and the client
purchases them."47 Consequently, attorneys should be subject to
the provisions of consumer fraud acts. In order, however, to fully
understand the special applicability of consumer fraud statutes to
lawyer advertising, it is necessary to understand the close nexus
between legal advertising and the advent of consumerism which
produced deceptive trade practice acts like the one in Texas.
B. The Rise of Consumer Legislation
As late as 1961, the American Bar Association (ABA), in For-
mal Opinion 302, demonstrated the then anti-consumer nature of
the practice of law by holding it unethical for a lawyer to habitu-
ally charge less than a bar association's minimum fee schedule for
the performance of a particular legal service.48 Ruling that the pro-
1979). Although the court in Reed held that the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Con-
sumer Protection Law applied to advertisements of legal services, because the injunctive
relief provided by the statute was granted only to the Attorney General, the plaintiffs had to
meet the burden of proof required in a traditional civil suit. See 376 So. 2d at 1069.
43. Id. at 1069 n.4.
44. Id. at 1068. According to the appellate court, the trial court interpreted pronounce-
ments by the United States Supreme Court to the effect that false advertising is subject to
restraint by the states only through disciplinary regulation. Id.
45. Id. at 1068-69.
46. Id. at 1069.
47. See 605 S.W.2d at 633.
48. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 302 (1961). "The establishment of




mulgation of such minimum fees was "a thoroughly laudable activ-
ity," the organized bar indicated that "no lawyer should be put in
the position of bidding competitively for clients. '49 The result of
such a practice, according to consumer activist Ralph Nader, was
that "millions of consumers had ... been overcharged throughout
the country." 50 Though the minimum fee was outlawed by the Su-
preme Court in 1975,51 this non-competitive and hence anti-con-
sumer philosophy was evident throughout the decades of the 1960s
and 1970s.
Consumerism came to the bar first through solicitation, then
through advertising. In 1963, the Supreme Court in NAACP v.
Button52 held that the associational freedoms contained in the first
amendment protected solicitation by branches of the NAACP of
cases designed to eliminate racial segregation. 3 In 1964, the Court
extended such protection to union solicitation of members to ad-
vance their rights to compensation from employers," and by 1971,
the solicitation of persons by organized groups for the protection of
rights, both civil and financial, became a virtual fact of life.5
The real push toward lawyer advertising started in 1965, when
the law came to the poor through the first formal federal funding
of organized legal services.56 Followed in 1966 by direct congres-
49. Id.
50. See R. NADER & M. GREEN, VERDicrs oN LAwYERS xii (1976).
51. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Supreme Court held that
minimum fee schedules violated the antitrust laws.
52. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
53. Id. at 429-32. The Court recognized the NAACP as protecting the important "law-
ful objectives of equality of treatment." Id. at 429.
54. See Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
55. See generally United Trans. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971);
United Mine Workers of Am. v. illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
Though an apparent fact of life, it was not universally accepted. The Court in United
Mine Workers approved the solicitation by a union of its members encouraging the mem-
bers and families to consult a union retained lawyer before settling cases with the union. See
389 U.S. at 219-21. Yet, following that opinion, New Jersey prohibited a lawyer from repre-
senting a trade association member as part of the lawyer's regular duties for the association,
even though all fees paid by the members went to the association. See N.J. Sup. Ct. Advi-
sory Comm. of Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 143, 92 N.J.L.J. 53 (1969). See also
id. at Formal Op. 172, 93 N.J.L.J. 81 (1970) (corporate lawyer paid by corporation to draw
wills for employees prohibited); Formal Op. 256, 96 N.J.L.J. 745 (1973) (labor union lawyer
paid by union drawing wills for members prohibited); Formal Op. 284, 97 N.J.L.J. 363
(1974) (attorney hired by profit corporation for tenants cannot be paid by corporation to
represent members of tenants' organization).
56. See Ventantonio, "Equal Justice Under the Law": The Evolution of a National
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sional funding of neighborhood legal services projects, the incep-
tion of such programs was seen by Nader as the birth of the ac-
tivist-lawyer.88 Though generally accepting the legal services
concept, not all members of the bar favored the activist
approach.59
The resistance of the bar to the solicitation cases, and the re-
luctance by some to wholeheartedly support legal services for the
poor, among other factors, led the bar to question its consumer
orientation. A 1971 report by a special ABA committee designed to
survey legal needs indicated: "There are some persons in the legal
profession, for example, who believe the general public, with in-
come above the poverty line, has many unsatisfied needs for legal
services. Others believe to the contrary."60
The dichotomy of such feelings was stated by Nader in 1976 as
the difference between the profession's "duty of service to all [and]
its monopolistic status under the law."'61 That status caused exter-
nal pressures to be applied to the profession as well. A 1973 Senate
subcommittee "provided substantial evidence that because of the
high cost of lawyers, Americans are deterred from obtaining
needed legal counsel. '6 2
Though other studies had been conducted, the result of all of
this discussion was the first national survey of the legal needs of
the public, conducted through the support of the ABA. 3 In the
end, the final report really failed to answer the question of whether
Commitment to Legal Services for the Poor and a Study of its Impact on New Jersey
Landlord-Tenant Law, 7 SETON HALL L. Ray. 233, 235 & n.6 (1976).
57. See id. at 237.
58. See R. NADER & M. GREEN, supra note 50, at viii.
59. See generally Ventantonio, supra note 56, at 245.
As adopted in 1969 by the American Bar Association, Ethical Consideration 2-25 pro-
vided in part: "[L]egal aid offices, lawyer referral services and other related programs have
been developed, and others will be developed, by the profession. Every lawyer should sup-
port all proper efforts to meet this need for legal services." Report of the Special Committee
on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 94 A.B.A. REP. 729, 740-41 (footnotes omitted). The
ethical consideration was adopted as part of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Id. at
392.
60. See Report of the Special Committee to Consider the Feasibility of Undertaking a
Comprehensive Survey of the Legal Profession, 96 A.B.A. REP. 311, 312 (1971).
61. R. NADER & M. GREEN, supra note 50, at vii.
62. Tunney & Frank, Epilogue: A Congressional Role in Lawyer Reform, in R. NADER
& X. GREEN, supra note 50, at 295, 297-98.
63. See B. CuRRm, THE LEGAL NEEDs OF THE PUBLIC 1 (1974). For a discussion of the
prior surveys and their results, see id. at 2-9.
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the legal needs of the public at large were going unmet.6 4 It is
clear, however, that such surveys and the discussions surrounding
them awakened the consciousness of the bar and the public to the
duties of the legal profession to meet consumer needs.6"
It is also clear that those discussions led to the conclusion by
activist lawyers that the way to meet the legal needs of the vast
middle class was advertising. Bates and O'Steen, who brought ad-
vertising to the Supreme Court, were former legal services lawyers
who subscribed to the view that the middle class had unmet legal
needs.6 Sensing that the way to make those legal needs known was
through advertising, Bates and O'Steen deliberately violated the
no advertising rules of DR 2-101.67 They were, of course, not the
only ones who believed that advertising was consistent with the
obligation of the lawyer to make legal services available. At the
time of the Supreme Court's landmark pronouncement on the sub-
ject, actions by both Consumer's Union" and the Department of
Justice 9 were pending, designed to open the advertising market to
lawyers.
Bates, though a landmark, was not the final chapter. Though
the ABA changed DR 2_10170 in a purported attempt to meet the
64. See A.B.A., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE To SURVEY LEGAL NEnDs 5
(1978). The Committee found no real way of determining how to measure "unmet legal
needs." Id.
65. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-33 (1980). This EC
was added in 1974. Id.
66. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 354 (1977). The aim of their clinic "was to provide legal
services at modest fees to persons of moderate income who did not qualify for government
legal aid." Id. Both Bates and O'Steen had been attorneys for the Maricopa County Legal
Aid Society. Id.
67. According to one author, the decision by Bates and O'Steen to violate DR 2-101 was
one which had to be made. The financial success of the clinic was based on a need to accom-
plish work on a volume basis. Accordingly, unless they attracted a substantial amount of
one-time business through advertising, the clinic simply could not work. See L. ANDREWS,
BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICTATON 3 (1980).
68. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumer's Union, 446 U.S. 719, 724-26 (1980). Con-
sumer's Union had begun, in 1974, to attempt to publish a legal directory but was unable to
do so because of the provisions of the code.
69. On June 25, 1976, the Justice Department filed suit against the ABA charging that
the ethics rules relating to advertising illegally restrained trade. See Justice Department
Charges Code Advertising Provisions Violate Federal Antitrust Laws, 62 A.B.A.J. 979
(1976). The suit was eventually dropped following the post-Bates rule amendments. See
Justice Department Dismisses Antitrust Suit Against American Bar Association, 64
A.B.A.J. 1538 (1978).
70. See A.B.A. Approves Lawyer Advertising Rules, 63 A.B.A.J. 1177, 1234 (1977). The
new rule first prohibited "false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair"
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mandate of the Court, and although some 29 states adopted the
advertising, then provided the "laundry list" of statements which may be advertised:
1) Name, including name of law firm and names of professional associates;
addresses and telephone numbers;
2) One or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm practices, a
statement that practice is limited to one or more fields of law, or a statement
that the lawyer or law firm specializes in a particular field of law practice, to the
extent authorized under DR 2-105;
3) Date and place of birth;
4) Date and place of admission to the bar of state and federal courts;
5) Schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees, and other scholastic
distinctions;
6) Public or quasi-public offices;
7) Military service;
8) Legal authorships;
9) Legal teaching position;
10) Memberships, offices, and committee assignments in bar association;
11) Membership and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies;
12) Technical and professional licenses;
13) Memberships in scientific, technical and professional associations and
societies;
14) Foreign language ability;
15) Names and addresses of bank references;
16) With their written consent, names of clients regularly represented;
17) Prepaid or group legal services programs in which the lawyer participates;
18) Whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are accepted;
19) Office and telephone answering service hours;
20) Fee for an initial consultation;
21) Availability upon request of a written schedule of fees and/or an estimate
of the fee to be charged for specific services;
22) Contingent fee rates subject to DR 2-106(c), provided that the statement
discloses whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of costs;
23) Range of fees for services, provided that the statement discloses that the
specific fee within the range which will be charged will vary depending upon the
particular matter to be handled for each client and the client is entitled without
obligation to an estimate of the fee within the range likely to be charged, in
print size equivalent to the largest print used in setting forth the fee
information;
24) Hourly rate, provided that the statement discloses that the total fee
charged will depend upon the number of hours which must be devoted to the
particular matter to be handled for each client and the client is entitled to with-
out obligation an estimate of the fee likely to be charged, in print size at least
equivalent to the largest print used in setting forth the fee information;
25) Fixed fees for specific legal services, the description of which would not
be misunderstood or be deceptive, provided that the statement discloses that the
quoted fee will be available only to clients whose matters fall into the services
described and that the client is entitled without obligation to a specific estimate
of the fee likely to be charged in print size at least equivalent to the largest print
used in setting forth the fee information.
Id. at 1235.
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regulatory "laundry list" approach of that new rule,71 only three of
those states, by 1980, would have permitted the advertisement
sanctioned in Bates. 2
The result, in In re R.M.J.,"3 was a new mandate to the states.
The strictly regulatory approach was no longer viable. That ap-
proach, manifested in Missouri through an addendum to DR 2-101,
permitted certain areas of practice to be advertised by name, but
forbade any deviation from the exact wording mentioned and any
mention of a limitation of practice.74 The Court classified lawyer
advertising in three categories: First, advertising which is false, or
which proves in fact to be false, can be banned. Second, advertis-
ing which may be false, such as field of practice advertising, cannot
be banned if it can be presented in a truthful way. Third, advertis-
ing which is truthful can be controlled, but only upon a showing of
a substantial state interest.7 5 Additionally, whenever the state at-
tempts to regulate either advertising that tends to deceive, or ad-
vertising which is truthful over which the state asserts a substan-
tial state interest, the regulation of that advertising must meet the
The rule originally permitted this advertising only in the print media. See id. In 1978,
however, the rule was amended to include television and radio advertisements. See TV Ad-
vertising by Wide Margin, 64 A.B.A.J. 1341 (1978).
Although it seemed new, the provisions of DR 2-101 had been in existence for some time.
An amended version of Canon 27, the pre-code version of the ethics rule, was enacted in
1937 to permit publication in approved law lists of information such as:
a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates,
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses, special branches of the profes-
sion practiced, date and place of birth and of admission to the Bar, schools at-
tended with dates of graduation and degrees received, public offices and posts of
honor held, bar and other association memberships and, with their consent, the
names of clients regularly represented.
Report of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, 62 A.B.A. REP. 350, 351-
52, 763 (1937). It thus appears that the new rule was no more than a reenactment of the old
rule with permission for further publication.
71. See L. ANDREwS, supra note 67, at 135 app. III.
72. See id. In fact, the ABA has surmised that R.M.J. voids the rules in 42 states. See
Supreme Court Report, 68 A.B.A.J. 342 (1982).
73. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
74. The court made clear "that the [s]tates retain the authority to regulate advertising
that is inherently misleading or that has proved to be misleading in practice." Id. at 207.
75. See id. at 203. "[T]he [s]tates may not place an absolute prohibition on certain
types of potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing of areas of practice, if the informa-
tion also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive." Id.
The Kutak Commission drafters indicate that such information may be highly relevant
to the potential consumer. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 7.1 legal back-
ground (Final Draft 1981). See also supra note 30.
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four-pronged test of Central Hudson Gas Co. v. Public Service
Commission:
At the outset, we must determine [1] whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision,
it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. [2] Next, we
ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquir-
ies yield positive answers, we must determine [3] whether the regulation di-
rectly advances the governmental interest asserted, and [4) whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 6
R.M.J. evidences a pro-consumer orientation on the issue of
lawyer advertising, an orientation previously noted in Bates, which
indicates that commercial advertising does carry an important
message about the availability, scope and price of services. Adver-
tising performs an essential service by aiding the consumer in "in-
formed and reliable decisionmaking. ' 77 Both Bates and R.M.J. re-
flect the influx of consumerism into the practice of law, and thus
follow a developing trend of the 1960s and 1970s toward protection
of the consumer. Running parallel to the increasingly-held view of
advertising as a consumer benefit was the growth of statutes
designed to prevent consumer fraud. "Since 1960, state consumer
protection legislation has been enacted at a rapid, even a dizzy
pace."78
In an attempt to unify this "dizzy" growth, the National Con-
ference on Uniform State Laws, together with the ABA, adopted
the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act in 1970.71 As indicated
by the drafters: "Consumers are entitled to protection from decep-
tive and unconscionable sales practices no matter where they live,
and businessmen are entitled to predictable standards of conduct
no matter where they sell."8' 0 The Uniform Act is thus intended to
simplify and clarify the law, encourage consumer protection, and
further the development of fair practices.8 '
76. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). R.M.J. adopted this test for lawyers. See 455 U.S. at 203
n.15.
77. 433 U.S. at 364 (citations omitted).
78. UNIFORM CONSUMER SAs PRAaCTcEs ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 7A
U.L.A. 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Uniform Act].
79. Id. at 1-2.
80. Id. at 1.
81. Id. at § 1.
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C. The Acts Themselves
Though the purpose of the Uniform Act was salutary, its
adoption did not prevent a proliferation of differing state legisla-
tion also designed to prevent consumer fraud. Thus, the statutory
scheme used in the DeBakey case in Texas is different from that of
the Uniform Act. By way of example rather than limitation, the
Uniform Law and various state consumer protection statutes are
reviewed here.
The purpose of these laws is "to protect consumers from sup-
pliers who commit deceptive and unconscionable sales practices. 82
As at least one state has interpreted such statutes, they are to be
construed as widely as possible to benefit the consumer,83 and as a
result are designed to tover not only the fast-talking salesperson,
but the non-soliciting seller as well. 4
While not identical, the statutes contain several common
features:
1) "services" are included within the definition of consumer
transaction,85 merchandise,86 or deceptive acts;87
2) the acts forbid either deceptive advertising,88 misrepresen-
tation about the quality of services, 89 or deception in furnishing
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Martin v. American Appliance, 174 N.J. Super. 382, 384,416 A.2d 933, 934
(Law Div. 1980) (act is remedial and thus should be "liberally construed"); State v. Hudson
Furniture Co., 165 N.J. Super. 516, 520, 398 A.2d 900, 902 (App. Div. 1979) (act to be inter-
preted to protect consumers).
84. See, e.g., Hyland v. Zubeck, 146 N.J. Super. 407, 413, 370 A.2d 20, 23 (App. Div.
1976) (consumer fraud statute applicable even where fraud is not widespread and can be
used against nonsoliciting business persons).
85. See Uniform Act, supra note 78, at § 2(1). See also Omo REV. CODE ANN. §
1345.01(A) (Page 1979).
86. See Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121
/2, § 261(1)(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.010(4) (Vernon 1979);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(c) (West Supp. 1981-82).
87. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981-82). California specifically
includes "services" within the definitional portion of its act. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1761(b)
(West 1973).
88. See Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121
1/2, § 262 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.020 (Vernon 1979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-2 (West Supp. 1981-82).
89. See Uniform Act, supra note 78, at § 3(b)(2). See also CAL. Civ. CODE § 1770(g)
(West Supp. 1982); OHIo RE v. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(B)(2) (Page 1979).
It must be noted that Ohio specifically exempts actions between attorney and client from
the operation of its deceptive trade practice act. See OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(A)
(Page 1979). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (1981) (North Carolina also exempts law-
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services;90
3) the acts provide a private cause of action to individuals who
are victimized by prohibited practices.9 1 Furthermore, many of the
acts permit the court hearing such a case to increase the damages
award, 2 and allow the awarding of attorney's fees. 3
yers); Tex. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590, § 12.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (Texas exempts
doctors).
90. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981-82).
91. See Uniform Act, supra note 78, at § 11. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780 (West
1973); Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §
270(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.025 (Vernon 1979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-19 (West Supp. 1982-83); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 350-d (McKinney Supp. 1981-
82); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.09 (Page 1979). It is the provision for a private cause of
action which separates state provisions from federal trade practice acts. Cf. Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-58 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (detailing powers of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission to prevent unfair trade practices). For further discussion of the fed-
eral act and related cases, see infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text. Generally, the
federal act does not permit a private cause of action. See, e.g., Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483
F.2d 279, 280 (9th Cir. 1973). The federal act, however, does not forbid a state from enacting
a provision which grants a cause of action to wronged consumers. See, e.g., Holiday Magic,
Inc. v. Warren, 357 F. Supp. 20, 28 (E.D. Wis. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 497 F.2d
687 (7th Cir. 1974).
At least one state has refused to grant a wronged client a private cause of action against
an attorney under a state statute. In Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 86 Wash. 2d 331, 544 P.2d 88
(1976), the client alleged that the attorney had been hired to defend him against a
threatened real estate foreclosure. The complaint, sounding in both malpractice and decep-
tive trade practice, alleged that the attorney had failed to take any action, resulting in the
foreclosure of the property. See id. at 331, 544 P.2d at 89. The attorney denied the charges.
The facts of the case perhaps reveal a classic example of how lawyers find themselves in
trouble without even knowing it:
The respondent admitted that he was retained by the appellant but denied
that he was retained to handle her delinquent account with the mortgagee bank.
The appellant alleged that when, in October 1970, she received the summons
and complaint in the foreclosure action, she took it in an envelope to the respon-
dent's office. He was out of town at the time, and she left it with the reception-
ist. The respondent said that it did not come to his attention until he reviewed
the appellant's file on December 29 or 30, 1970 at which time he discovered the
unopened envelope.
Id. at 332 n.1, 544 P.2d at 89 n.1.
In Washington, however, the courts were directed to follow the decision under the fed-
eral act and consequently were obligated to deny private relief. See id. at 333, 544 P.2d at
89.
The malpractice portion of the complaint was also dismissed because the statute of limi-
tations had run. See id. at 332, 544 P.2d at 89.
92. See Uniform Act, supra note 78, at § 11(b) (actual damages or $100, whichever is
greater). See also CAL. Civ. CODE § 1780(a)(3) (West 1973) (punitive damages); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 407.025(1) (Vernon 1979) (discretionary punitive damages); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-
19 (West Supp. 1982-83) (treble damages); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 350-d(3) (McKinney
Supp. 1981-82) (actual damages or $50, whichever is greater, plus the court in its discretion
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As has been shown, deceptive trade practice acts arose to pro-
tect consumers from shady marketplace techniques, and they ap-
ply to services as well as products. Lawyer advertising arose in part
to educate unsophisticated consumers about the availability of ser-
vices. The Supreme Court has recognized that states may regulate
lawyer advertising to prevent deception. Logically, it follows that a
deceptive trade practice act should be a way of protecting consum-
ers from the deceptive marketing of lawyer services.
II. PRACTICE UNDER DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE ACTS
A. The Components of a Cause of Action
Deceptive trade practice acts supplement common law actions
for fraud. 4 To be successful in a suit alleging deceptive advertising
by a lawyer, a consumer must prove: 1) that the advertising was
deceptive; 2) that the consumer was damaged; and 3) that the
damage was caused by the deceptive advertising. 5
Thus, under the statutes governing the Federal Trade Com-
mission's powers to regulate false advertising, there is no require-
ment that a "random sample" of consumer perceptions be taken to
determine the falsity of the advertising.9 Advertising must be
judged in its entirety,97 and may be false both as a result of state-
ments which are made as well as statements which the advertising
may increase the award up to treble damages but not exceeding $1,000); Omo REv. CODE
ANN. § 1345.09(B) (Page 1979) (treble damages or $200, whichever is greater).
93. See Uniform Act, supra note 78, at § 11(e). See also Consumer Fraud and Decep-
tive Business Practices Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 2, § 270(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-
83); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.025(1) (Vernon 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West Supp.
1982-83); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 350-d(3) (McKinney Supp. 1981-82); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.09(F) (Page 1979).
94. See State ex rel Danforth v. Independence Dodge, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 362, 368 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1973). As a result, an "overly meticulous definition" that might be applicable in a
common law fraud action is avoided in favor of a judicial case-by-case determination of the
fairness of a transaction. Id.
95. See Comment, Applicability of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act to Attor-
neys, 30 BAYLOR L. REv. 65, 67 (1978). Once these elements are proved, liability attaches,
because, under these types of legislation, "fault" on the part of the advertiser is not a rele-
vant criterion. See, e.g., id.
96. See, e.g., J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884, 890 (6th Cir. 1967) (in determin-
ing if consumers were misled by Geritol advertising, FTC not required to sample consumer
perceptions of the advertising claims).
97. See, e.g., FTC v. Simeon Management Corp., 391 F. Supp. 697, 704 (N.D. Cal.
1975), afl'd, 532 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1976).
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fails to make."s The issue, quite simply, is the overall impact of the
advertising upon the consumers it is designed to attract.9 0 As a re-
sult, there is no requirement that the advertiser intend that the
advertising be false,100 nor is it material that the advertiser acted
in "good" or "bad" faith.101
Under the federal act, deception is established by a subjective
standard: Is the advertising, taken in its entirety, likely to deceive
a potential consumer? To answer that question requires viewing
advertising from the consumer perspective. Traditionally, in deal-
ing with claims against lawyers, an objective standard is used: Did
the lawyer "exercise the skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed
by attorneys under similar circumstances?'" 2 Such a standard ob-
viously includes notions of fault.103 Transposed into a standard of
care for the lawyer-advertiser, the objective standard would read:
Did the attorney exercise ordinary care to prevent potential decep-
tion to the consumer?
As is evident, imposition of the subjective standard on lawyer-
advertisers would impose a higher duty of care than the objective
standard. It would also change the focus of the trial. The objective
standard focuses on the reasonable attorney, and in the malprac-
tice context expert testimony is usually necessary to determine
what the reasonable attorney would do. T'0 The subjective standard
would focus on the perceptions of the consumer, without regard to
the reasonableness of the attorney, and thus expert testimony
would not aid a jury, 05 all of whom are consumers.
98. See 391 F. Supp. at 702.
99. See, e.g., FTC v. National Health Aids, Inc., 1088 F. Supp. 340, 347 (D. Md. 1952).
100. See, e.g., Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 309 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980) (mental state not an element of such an offense).
101. See, e.g., Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921, 925 (6th
Cir. 1968). In certain state legislation, however, good faith may provide an exemption from
all or a portion of liability. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1784 (West 1973).
102. See R. MALLEN & V. LEvrrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 112 (1977) (emphasis omitted).
103. See Comment, supra note 96, at 71.
104. See R. MALLEN & V. LEvrT, supra note 102, at § 422.
105. To justify the use of expert testimony, the subject matter of the testimony must
generally be so related to some profession, science or business "as to be beyond the ken of
the average layman." C. McCoRMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13 (2d ed. 1972). In the legal
malpractice context, if the error of the attorney "is within the common knowledge of lay-
men," no expert is needed. See R. MALLEN & V. LEvrrr, supra note 102, at § 423.
In looking at the perceptions of a consumer, whether a particular advertisement is de-
ceptive does not require the kind of "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge"
which bespeaks of expert testimony. Cf. FED. R. EvID. 702 (standard for deciding if expert
[Vol. 31
LAWYER ADVERTISING
B. Justifying the Subjective Standard
In considering whether the consumer's view of advertising
should determine the civil liability of attorney-advertisers, it must
be recalled that one of the reasons justifying any regulation of the
commercial speech of lawyer-advertisers is the relative lack of so-
phistication about legal services of the legal consumer. To permit
the lawyer-advertiser to play on that lack of sophistication and not
subject him to a higher standard of care is to permit the lawyer
who chooses to advertise to have all of the benefits of advertising
without any of the responsibilities.
Viewing the telephone book listings in Zimmerman as an ex-
ample, Zimmerman was the only lawyer listed under the designa-
tion "Insurance Law. 10 6 It must be considered likely that a legal
consumer with an insurance problem would call Zimmerman as op-
posed to some of the other lawyers listed under the heading "Gen-
eral Practice. 1 0 7 To be sure, many general practice lawyers handle
insurance problems. In fact, most routine insurance problems can
probably be handled by a general practice lawyer. From a lawyer's
point of view, there is thus probably little difference between the
reasonable competence of the lawyer advertising insurance and the
lawyer advertising a general practice. There is no deception in ei-
ther listing. To judge Zimmerman, however, by the same standard
as the general practice lawyer is to apply a professional's view of
insurance law. From the consumer's point of view, the consumer in
Zimmerman had an insurance problem and saw only one name
under "Insurance Law." Would any consumer be aware that a gen-
eral practice lawyer could probably handle the matter? Even if he
were, would he not expect more of a lawyer who is listed under the
heading than he would of the remaining general practitioners? If
Zimmerman wishes to list himself under "Insurance Law," is it un-
fair that the legal system evaluate him from the point of view of
those consumers he is trying to attract?
testimony required). In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has indicated that expert testi-
mony is not required to determine whether a piece of writing or movie is pornographic. See,
e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973);
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). Surely if a jury is capable of determin-
ing pornography, it is capable, without expert aid, of determining if a particular advertise-
ment is deceptive.
106. See 79 A.D.2d at 267 app. A., 438 N.Y.S.2d at 404 app. A.
107. There are seven listings under "General Practice," including Zimmerman. Id.
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In Bates, the Supreme Court indicated that "advertising
claims as to the quality of legal services... probably are not sus-
ceptible of precise measurement or verification and, under some
circumstances, might well be deceptive or misleading to the public,
or even false." 10 8 While the Court did not define "quality" adver-
tising, it can generally be seen in two contexts: subjective quality,
that the services of one lawyer are better than those of another,
and objective quality, that the services of a lawyer are the "best"
or "finest" available. In R.M.J. the Court indicated that listings of
areas of practice cannot be banned."" When a consumer looks at a
listing of lawyers by fields of practice, the listing itself, under a
particular field, is an implied statement of both subjective and ob-
jective quality. It implies that the listed lawyer is better than those
lawyers not listed and further implies a factual representation of
experience. When a doctor's listing in the telephone yellow pages
indicates, "practice limited to the eye," the doctor is held to a spe-
cialist's degree of care. 110 While it is true that a higher standard of
care has not gained wide popularity in decisions dealing with legal
malpractice,1 1 part of the recalcitrance toward adopting such a
108. See 433 U.S. at 383-84.
109. See 455 U.S. at 203.
110. See generally Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 953 (1968).
In a survey of a membership of over 42,000, the ABA's Committee on Advertising and
Specialization of the Section of Corporation Banking and Business Law expressed concern
about lawyers using similar types of advertising:
Our members are uncomfortable with field-of-practice advertising without mini-
mum standards imposed by the states through the regulation of those entitled to
engage in such advertising.
In part the discomfort stems from a belief that the public cannot reasonably
be expected to appreciate that a lawyer advertising as:
John J. Jones, Esq.
Corporate Finance and Securities
or
John J. Jones, Esq.
Practice Limited to
Corporate Finance and Securities
may have no significant background, special training, or specific education in the
area.
Discussion Draft: Advertising, Specialization and the Business Lawyer, 35 Bus. LAW. 303,
306-07 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Advertising and Specialization]. The final draft of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct indicates that the phrase "practice limited to" would
imply specialization and would not be permitted. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 7.4 comment (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
111. See R. MALLUEN & V. Lavrrr, supra note 102, at § 114. The opportunity for an
increased standard of care has presented itself. New York cases decided in the early 1900s
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standard has been the legal profession's prohibition against adver-
tising. In medicine, if a doctor holds himself out as having a higher
degree of skill, then a higher standard is applied. The same should
provided the backdrop for imposing a stricter standard of care on attorneys who claim a
specialized knowledge in a particular area of the law. In the 1902 New York case of Childs v.
Comstock, 69 A.D. 160, 74 N.Y.S. 643 (1st Dep't 1902), the court considered the specialized
nature of the legal practice in holding the attorney liable for a failure to timely appeal from
a decision made by the U.S. Board of Appraisers imposing importation duties on the client's
imports into New York. Id. at 164-65, 74 N.Y.S. at 646. The attorney defended on the
ground of the Board's unique system of giving notice of its decisions. Id. at 165, 74 N.Y.S. at
646-47. The court, finding negligence, wrote:
The defendants were experts in that line of business, and aside from these pro-
tests they represented a very large percentage of all protests filed against the
imposition of tariff duties that were heard before the board of general apprais-
ers. They were familiar with the practice of the government officials and aware
of the risk in relying on the irregular practice in the transmission of notices of
their decisions by the board of general appraisers.
Id. at 165, 74 N.Y.S. at 646. See also Trimboli v. Kinkel, 226 N.Y. 147, 123 N.E. 205 (1919).
In Trimboli, the attorney failed to find error in a land title, certifying it instead as marketa-
ble when it was not. Id. at 149-50, 123 N.E. at 205. Justice Cardozo wrote in the opinion, "It
is negligence to fail to apply the settled rules of law that should be known to all conveyanc-
ers." Id. at 150, 123 N.E. at 206.
In 1934, however, a radical departure from the line of reasoning developing in the New
York courts occurred in the Illinois case of Olson v. North, 276 MI1. App. 457 (1934). In
Olson, the attorney was sued by his client for an alleged failure to use reasonable care and
skill in his defense of the client under an indictment for murder. Id. at 460. Although the
attorney held himself out as" 'especially qualified in the defense of criminal cases, including
murder cases,"' the court did not impose a stricter standard of care in the case, holding the
attorney instead to "'a reasonable degree of care and skill."' Id. at 461, 473.
Following Olson, however, commentators indicated that a change in the reasonable care
rule was necessary. Writing in 1953, one author noted that a tax expert should be held to a
higher standard than other lawyers doing tax work. Such a rule would make lawyers cau-
tious about holding themselves out as experts in particular fields. Blaustein, Liability of
Attorney to Client in New York for Negligence, 19 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 233, 256 (1953). Other
commentators hav6 echoed this sentiment. See, e.g., Comment, Attorney Malpractice, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 1292, 1303-04 (1963); Note, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43 IND.
L.J. 771, 786-88 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Standard in Legal Malpractice]. Today, the
Restatement adopts this same approach, indicating that a professional will be held to the
traditional standard of care "[u]nless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowl-
ege." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
This specialist standard received judicial recognition in 1975. In Wright v. Williams, 47
Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1975), plaintiffs were referred by a general practitioner
to the defendant, a specialist in maritime law, regarding acquisition of clear title to a sea-
going vessel. Id. at 805, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 196. Although holding for the defendant lawyer
because of an absence of expert testimony, the court nevertheless held "that a lawyer hold-
ing himself out to the public and the profession as specializing in an area of the law must
exercise the skill, prudence, and diligence exercised by the other specialists of ordinary skill
and capacity specializing in the same field." Id. at 810, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 199. One other
court has since adopted a similar standard. See Rodriguez v. Horton, 95 N.M. 356, 359, 622
P.2d 261, 264 (Ct. App. 1980).
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be true of lawyers particularly since "the 'holding out' exists inde-
pendently of a formal recognition of legal specialization.' 1 12 Thus,
when lawyers choose to follow the course of their medical brethren,
the public will assume that the advertisement carries the same
qualitative implication.113 To permit the consumer's perception of
what is meant by the implied statements of quality in field of prac-
tice advertising simply supports the Supreme Court's view that
such advertising "might well be deceptive or misleading to the
public.""'
C. The Effect of a Disclaimer
In its advertising rulings, the Supreme Court indicated that in
order to prevent confusion, a supplement by way of warning or dis-
claimer could be required in advertisements." 5 Such a disclaimer
was required in Missouri prior to R.M.J.,"8e and its constitutional-
ity was not challenged. 1 7 Prior to R.M.J., whenever a practice area
was listed in Missouri, it had to be followed by the statement:
"Listing of the above areas of practice does not indicate any certi-
fication of expertise therein.""" Because the decision as to whether
advertising is deceptive will be judged from a consumer rather
than legal perspective, it is important to determine the reasonable-
ness of using such a disclaimer from the consumer's view.
In Lovett and Linder Ltd. v. Carter, a Rhode Island case in
which the attorneys used a non-required disclaimer, 19 a survey
112. See Standard in Legal Malpractice, supra note 111, at 787.
113. See Advertising and Specialization, supra note 110, at 307. But see Lovett & Lin-
der, Ltd. v. Carter, 523 F. Supp. 903 (D.R.I. 1981). In Lovett & Linder, a marketing profes-
sor's survey of 33 people indicated that all but one of those people believed that the Lovett
& Linder advertisement listing 17 areas of practice only meant that the lawyers were gener-
alists. Id. at 911. The one exception was a management scientist who used similar advertis-
ing. Id. Several of the people commented, however, "that the 'lawyer is spreading himself
too thin."' The Lovett & Linder court discounted this survey. Id.
114. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 366.
115. See id. at 384; R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 201.
116. Id. at 195 n.6.
117. Id. at 204 & n.18.
118. Id. at 195 n.6 (quoting from Advisory Comm., Missouri Bar Administration, Ad-
dendum to DR 2-101(B)(2), 34 J. Mo. BAR 51 (1978)).
119. 523 F. Supp. 903 (D.R.I. 1981). Lovett & Linder was an action seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of a state supreme court order arising out of a
finding of unethical conduct by the attorneys but imposing no discipline. See Carter v.
Lovett & Linder, Inc., 425 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1981) (for state supreme court decision). The
advertisement, while listing specific areas of practice, made no claims that attorneys listed
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conducted by a University of Rhode Island marketing professor re-
vealed that seven of the ten people who commented on the dis-
claimer indicated that they did not like its use. 120 As noted by the
court, "[T]he disclaimer type of ad is even more pernicious in that
it deliberately states an untruth, i.e., lack of expertise in areas in
which the lawyer believes that he or she is a qualified expert."121
In Zimmerman, the advertisements by areas of practice are on
one page. At the top of that page is the indication that the listing
of the lawyer under an area does not indicate any more expertise
than that possessed by any other lawyer. 122 The court found, how-
ever, that the purpose of the advertising was "to convey the im-
pression that the advertising lawyers have a special expertise in
the area of law in which their name is listed, 1 23 thereby discount-
ing the disclaimer as "ambiguous. 1 24
In shori, as to deceptive trade practice cases, the use of a dis-
claimer appears to add very little towards preventing deception. In
fact the disclaimer may add to the deception. As a result, in a de-
ceptive trade practice case, while a disclaimer may be used as a
factor in judging the advertising in its entirety, it should not be
permitted as a defense to the action.
D. The Deterrent Effect of Deceptive Trade Practice Liability
For the lawyer, advertising is a means of attracting clients.
Even assuming that the vast majority of lawyers will advertise
within the bounds of ethical propriety, 25 the very competitive na-
ture of advertising encourages lawyers to develop a message, to tai-
lor an advertising campaign to a particular audience;126 in short, to
work close to the ethics barrier, without going beyond it. Because a
under a certain area were experts or specialists in that field. See 523 F. Supp. at 906, 911.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See 79 A.D.2d at 267 app. A., 438 N.Y.S.2d at 404 app. A.
123. Id. at 265, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
124. Id. Reading the advertising as the Zimmerman court does, it would also be unethi-
cal within the meaning of DR 6-102(A). See MODEL CODE OF PROPESSIONAL REsPONSmILrrY
DR 6-102(A) (1981). This rule provides: "a lawyer shall not attempt to exonerate himself
from or limit his liability to his client for his personal malpractice." Id. If a lawyer holds
himself out by listing areas of practice, thereby enticing clients with problems in those prac-
tice areas, such a disclaimer would, from the consumer's point of view, appear to be a limita-
tion of liability.
125. See 433 U.S. at 379.
126. See L. ANDREws, supra note 67, at 27-42.
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lawyer earns a living practicing in the profession,127 because of the
nature of advertising, and because discipline has been negligible in
dealing with the lawyer whose advertising slides over the line of
propriety, the current system is not a deterrent. The potential
financial reward from an effective advertising scheme may be
deemed to outweigh the potential risks.
This is particularly so in light of current malpractice stan-
dards. The potential client who is attracted to lawyer Zimmerman
by his listing under a particular area and pays a $500 advance fee,
but is forced to discharge the attorney because of his inexperience,
and have the legal problem resolved by another attorney, is not
likely to sue Zimmerman for malpractice. Even assuming that a
higher standard of care is applicable because Zimmerman adver-
tised, 128 the costs of suit, including the costs of hiring a lawyer to
sue a lawyer and an expert to establish Zimmerman's absence of
care, would quickly consume a $500 recovery.
Yet, for the vast majority of middle-income Americans, for
whose benefit advertising can be said to exist, that $500 is a sub-
stantial sum. If the same suit were filed under a deceptive trade
practice act, the successful client could recover the costs of suit
and attorney's fees. In addition, no expert testimony would be
needed. The result is that the middle-income victim of false or de-
ceptive advertising is able to recoup relatively small amounts of
actual damages without expending additional sums that the con-
sumer may be unable to afford.
The major deterrent of using trade practice acts for deceptive
lawyer advertising lies in the provisions for increasing the damages
award, in some statutes a trebling of the damages, as well as the
awarding of attorney's fees for successful suits. These additional
damages provisions must be considered essentially as punitive
damages. 29 As such, there is little likelihood that such awards are
covered by malpractice insurance. Some malpractice policies spe-
cifically exclude exemplary or punitive damages.130 All policies ex-
127. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 368.
128. Cf. supra note 111 (stricter standard of care for attorneys claiming specialized
knowledge).
129. See Neveroski v. Blair, 141 N.J. Super. 365, 382, 358 A.2d 473, 482 (App. Div.
1976). "[T]he treble damages provision of the act was intended both to compensate a victim
for his loss and in addition provide a punitive recovery." Id.
130. In their book on malpractice, Mallen and Levitt have included as an appendix,
portions of the liability policies of American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida, Ameri-
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clude fraud.13 1 Even where there is no specific exclusion, there may
be an implied exclusion based on the very nature of punitive dam-
ages: "[T]he purpose of assessing punitive damages is not to recog-
nize any special merit of the victim's claim but to punish the
wrongdoer; allowing the wrongdoer to shift the responsibility for
punitive damages to an insurer would thwart this public policy
favoring punishment. '1 2
The same rationale should exist for the payment by a decep-
tive trade practice defendant of plaintiff's attorney's fees. The in-
surance policies obligate the malpractice carrier to cover "dam-
ages" which the insured is obligated to pay.13 3 It is certainly
arguable that, under the American view, the award of counsel fees
is punitive rather than compensatory. 34
As has been seen, the current method of imposing discipline
on lawyers who engage in deceptive advertising has resulted in
rather mild sanctions. As a result, the benefits of advertising, even
if deceptive, may, to some lawyers, outweigh the risks associated
with professional discipline. When, however, the lawyer who seeks
to engage in advertising knows that personal financial liability can
result from deceptive advertising techniques, through the imposi-
tion of punitive damage liability, attorney's fees, neither of which
would be covered by malpractice insurance, and costs of suit, the
can Home Assurance Company, The St. Paul Property Liability Insurance Company, and
the Travelers Insurance Company. See L. MALLEN & V. LEvrrr, supra note 102, at 565-613
app.
The policies of the American Home Assurance Company and the St. Paul Property Lia-
bility Insurance Company specifically exclude punitive damage awards. See id. at 595 app.,
605 app.
131. See Schnidman & Saizer, The Legal Malpractice Dilemma: Will New Standards
of Care Place Professional Liability Insuiance Beyond the Reach of the Specialist, 9 Sw.
L.J. 613, 635 (1977). The American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida policy excludes
"any act, error, or omission which is dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious.' See L.
MALLEN & V. LEvirr, supra note 102, at 568 app. The American Home Assurance Company
policy excludes any claim arising out of any active or deliberate, dishonest or fraudulent
acts or omissions of any insured." Id. at 595 app. The St. Paul Property Liability Insurance
Company policy excludes actions arising "out of or in connection with any dishonest, fraud-
ulent, criminal or malicious act or omission of any Insured." Id. at 605 app. The Travelers
Insurance Company policy is not applicable "to any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or mali-
cious act or omission of any insured." Id. at 612 app.
132. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW, BASIC TEXT § 5.3(f) (1971).
133. See policies referred to supra note 130.
134. Cf. C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 85 (1935) (some courts, including the United States
Supreme Court, have disapproved of gauging punitive damages by referring to the plaintiff's
costs of litigation-including attorney's fees).
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lawyer will be deterred from false or fraudulent advertising. Those
lawyers who are truly qualified in special areas will have little to
fear, while those who are not so qualified will become cautious
about overestimating their market and their abilities. 3 5 The result
will thus be consistent with the policies enunciated by the Su-
preme Court in its advertising decisions: to aid the consumer in the
process of selecting competent counsel while at the same time con-
trolling advertising which is false, fraudulent or misleading.
CONCLUSION
In 1970, the Clark Committee, designed to evaluate lawyer dis-
cipline, 3 16 wrote: "It is imperative that bar associations establish a
procedure to enable laymen to find counsel to represent them in
legitimate [civil] claims against attorneys.' ' 37 Other authors have
suggested a free market regulation of the profession through use of
civil suits. 38 Deregulation of the legal profession is not an accept-
able substitute for what currently exists. Such writings focus on
the process of regulation rather than on the real issue; providing
effective quality control of the profession so that legal consumers
can be given what they deserve: competent legal services.
Both regulation and free market controls are necessary be-
cause the purpose of discipline is different from the purpose of free
market control. Discipline exists to protect the public in the fu-
ture, by weeding out those who have shown themselves to be un-
worthy of public trust based on past conduct. The free market civil
suit is designed to offer recompense to those individuals who suffer
financial loss as a consequence of present legal misconduct by a
lawyer.
At present, only the disciplinary model is being used in at-
tempting to regulate deceptive lawyer advertising. In light of
R.M.J, the status of such regulation appears in substantial doubt.
As a result, the unsophisticated consumer is left without adequate
protection. It is thus time to grant official sanction to the use of
civil remedies as an aid to clients who have been wronged by law-
135. See Blaustein, supra note 111, at 256.
136. See Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement,
95 A.B.A. RFP. 783 (1970). Retired Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark was chairman of
this special committee. Id.
137. Id. at 984.
138. See Martyn, supra note 32, at 732.
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yers.139 The deceptive trade practice suit is just such a remedy for
clients beguiled by deceptive advertising. As an additional compo-
nent of bar regulation of advertising, it should prove an effective
adjunct.
139. Id. at 742.
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